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Abstract 
The shareholder empowerment debate in corporate law is premised upon a reoc-
curring assumption that, historically, there has been an erosion of shareholder 
rights. This article contends that this premise is inaccurate and that shareholder 
rights have remained fundamentally constant. It goes on to argue that a more 
promising approach to the existing understanding of rights in the shareholder 
empowerment debate may be found in the broader legal rights literature. In analys-
ing shareholder rights through this lens it is contended that, while there has not 
been an appreciable abrogation of shareholder rights, it is in the nature of legal 
rights per se to contain power whilst simultaneously reinforcing the institutions and 
structures from where those rights emanate. 
Keywords: company law, corporate governance, shareholders, rights theory. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An increasingly pivotal and divisive subject of legal enquiry in corporate govern-
ance concerns the question of how to apportion decision-making power between 
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directors and shareholders in large public corporations. One recent high-profile 
aspect of these intellectual efforts can be found in a 2006 special edition of the 
Harvard Law Review.1 Lucian Bebchuk pressed for an expanded role for share-
holder voting rights in corporate governance as a formal legal remedial mechanism 
to control managers’ decision-making power, while Stephen Bainbridge rebuked the 
apparent negative impact shareholder empowerment might have on the efficiency 
of such centralised decision-making structures in public corporations. Central to 
this latter understanding is the view that giving shareholders more authority will 
lead to worse managerial decision-making because shareholders are typically 
uninformed, or worse, irrational. This approach expresses a preference for empow-
ering centralised management to make and pursue business decisions through 
diverse means, subject to minimal important constraints. At the policy-making 
level, as a corollary of this intransient issue, the question of whether shareholders 
should be afforded stronger powers as a check on managerial control has also been 
a major theme in US.2 and European.3 regulatory responses to the global financial 
crisis, and, in and of itself, has generated an entire specialised thread of scholarship. 
Clearly, then, the dynamics and interests of shareholders as stewards of the wider 
public interest in the case of systemic institutions is a highly complex issue. 
This article joins this dialogue on shareholder rights with a different voice. De-
spite the pre-eminence of this scholarly and policy activity, which mobilises con-
flicting intellectual and political aspirations, the efforts that are currently being 
                                                                                                                                               
1 L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’, 118 Harvard Law Review 
(2005) p. 833; L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules’, 119 Harvard Law 
Review (2006) p. 1784; S. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’, 118 
Harvard Law Review (2006) p. 1735. See also L. Strine, ‘Towards a True Corporate Republic: A 
Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America’, 119 Harvard 
Law Review (2006) p. 1759. 
2 Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation (2006). In 2006, shareholder empowerment figured prominently in a well-
publicised US law reform agenda presented by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation. 
The Committee’s Report recommended increased shareholder rights as an alternative regulatory 
technique to a more stringent rules-based approach. It connected shareholder power to market 
control, reasoning that enhanced shareholder rights provide accountability and that accountability 
means lower agency costs, higher market prices and, accordingly, a more competitive equity 
marketplace. 
3 The European Commission’s first Green Paper in June 2010 was on the corporate govern-
ance of financial institutions and was followed, in April 2011, by a Green Paper on corporate 
governance of all European corporations. See European Commission, ‘Green Paper. Corporate 
Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies’, COM (2010) 284 final; Euro-
pean Commission, ‘Green Paper. The EU Corporate Governance Framework’, COM (2011) 164 
final. These two reports conclude that, in many cases, the lack of effective control mechanisms 
contributed significantly to excessive risk-taking by directors during the financial crisis. The 
solution proposed was, unexpectedly, more shareholder empowerment to counter perceived 
shareholder passivity. 
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made to establish a standard repertory of institutional responses to the problem of 
discretion in the relations of managers and shareholders presents, in a reinforcing 
pattern, a flawed reading of history. To this point, much of the classical legal 
thought, at least to some measure, shares in common one distinct and important 
starting-off point. In particular, the academic and practitioner consensus narrative 
on the subject is unnecessarily constrained by a series of false necessities or suppo-
sitions that once effective shareholder participatory rights, due to changes in the 
law’s basic facultative structure, have over the last century been subject to ‘direct 
and indirect erosion or elimination’.4 This article challenges the epistemology of the 
entire shareholder empowerment debate. This epistemology treats competitive 
market pressures as well as market-based incentive and disciplinary mechanisms as 
shareholder control predicated upon substantive legal rules, and pays insufficient 
regard to the ideological characteristic of those underlying governance rules. It is 
submitted instead that there has not been an appreciable erosion of shareholder 
rights. Rights, it is argued, do cut both ways – serving at some times and under 
some circumstances to provide a genuinely participatory process for shareholders 
and at other times to reinforce a power differential that gives preference to corpo-
rate management. This ambivalence means that an imbalance of power dynamics, 
which are inherent in the recurring bargains between investors and the corporation, 
is not a recent abnormality but can be traced back to the start of early corporations 
legislation as an inherent corollary of the nature of legal rights and constitutional 
rights within a capitalist structural form. There has yet to be clear recognition that 
these internal devices to protect shareholders from managerial discretion have not 
eroded but remained constant and unchanged – ‘crude, imprecise, and fragile’5 – a 
view which, by definition, means that no important power-balancing gains for 
investors can be won in the legal arena. Any discussion of shareholder rights should 
be clear about this, in order to avoid confusion. 
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 begins by setting out the 
substance and parameters of the shareholder empowerment debate. Section 3 sets 
out the erosion doctrine thesis which is inherent in the dissonance of this dialogue. 
                                                                                                                                               
4 R.M. Buxbaum, ‘The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance’, 73 California 
Law Review (1985) p. 1671, at pp. 1678 and 1732. See also R.M. Buxbaum, ‘Corporate Legiti-
macy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine’, 45 Ohio State Law Journal (1984) p. 515, at pp. 
525-542; W. Werner, ‘Corporation Law in Search of Its Future’, 81 Columbia Law Review (1981) 
p. 1611, at p. 1613, referring to this view as the ‘erosion doctrine’; R. Nolan, ‘The Continuing 
Evolution of Shareholder Governance’, 65 Cambridge Law Journal (2006) p. 92, at p. 96; M. 
Kahan and E.B. Rock, ‘On Improving Shareholder Voting’, in J. Armour and J. Payne, eds., 
Rationality in Company Law (Hart 2009), at p. 258. 
5 M. Kahan and E.B. Rock, ‘The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting’, 96 Georgetown Law 
Journal (2008) p. 1227, at p. 1279. See also H.G. Manne, ‘The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern 
Corporation’, 62 Columbia Law Review (1962) p. 399, at p. 408. Henry Manne submits that ‘[t]he 
loss of effective democratic control by shareholders, which was documented in the Berle and 
Means book, had long been a cause for concern’. 
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Section 4 provides an explanation of the governance structure in UK and US public 
corporations, being the focus of this article, and discusses how power is typically 
allocated between directors and shareholders in the corporation. This will outline 
corporate law issues in broad terms and only to the extent necessary to explain the 
primary concern in this article: that is, how the scholarship and policy documents 
problematically embed shareholder participatory rights as an important corporate 
law norm, and what this means for the nature of large corporations and the extent of 
shareholder control. It is not the purpose of this article to examine the status of 
investors,6 but to focus specifically on the nature and extent of shareholder partici-
patory rights. Section 5 sets forth the article’s thesis through a detailed considera-
tion of the rhetoric of rights as an instrument in both law and literature. It argues 
that shareholders have power, in the broadest sense. But any understanding of the 
traditional structure that presumes affirmative legal rights confers unwarranted 
significance on this ideal, while overlooking reality. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are offered. The main purpose of this article is to consider this familiar 
question once again and hopefully to suggest a different conceptual framework with 
which to evaluate the relationship between management and shareholders. By 
developing this outline and potentially identifying issues for the future, the hope is 
to recast, even in some small way, the current dialogue on shareholder rights. 
2. ON THE SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT QUESTION 
It is axiomatic that the emergence of large publically held enterprises at the upper 
levels of all capitalist economies in the late nineteenth century, with their manage-
rial bureaucracy and increasing reliance on external finance from bank loans and 
equity shares, brought about a degree of separation of ownership from day-to-day 
control.7 Crucially, the empirical findings contained within Adolf Berle’s and 
Gardiner Means’ classic treatise on the modern corporation,8 the terms and tenors of 
                                                                                                                                               
6 This is undertaken very elegantly elsewhere. See, generally, P. Ireland, ‘Company Law and 
the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’, 62 Modern Law Review (1999) p. 32; R. Grantham, ‘The 
Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders’, 57 Cambridge Law Journal (1998) p. 
554; R. Sappideen, ‘Ownership of the Law Corporation: Why Clothe the Emperor?’, 7 King’s 
College Law Journal (1996) p. 27. 
7 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’, 
54 Journal of Finance (1999) p. 471, at pp. 492-493; M. Faccio and L.H.P. Lang, ‘The Ultimate 
Ownership of Western European Corporations’, 65 Journal of Financial Economics (2002) p. 
365, at pp. 379-380; M. Neocleous, ‘Staging Power: Marx, Hobbes and the Personification of 
Capital’, 14 Law and Critique (2003) p. 147, at p. 155. 
8 A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Bruns-
wick 1932). This was simply an extension of Berle’s earlier studies in the law of corporate 
finance. See A.A. Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance (Callaghan and Co. 1928). 
See also Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s account, a year later, which forms part of a much-cited 
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which are by now numbingly familiar, implied that traditional share ownership, 
with rare exceptions, was becoming so fragmented and dispersed into myriad 
holdings that it left managers in de facto control of the corporation and diluted the 
dominance of money-capital.9 James Hurst observed that surging changes in the 
economy after 1890 brought pressure for large-scale enterprises run by strong 
centralised managements.10 It is generally recognised that the board and manage-
ment must be given a certain degree of freedom to be successful. Still, whilst the 
directors (and through them, the managers) are representatives of the shareholders 
(and sometimes of other constituencies as well) with power and authority to gener-
ate value, the central question for corporate law is: can we, in fact, trust them to do 
what we have empowered them to do? This is the central conundrum for contempo-
rary corporate law. The problem is that empowered managers may not always use 
their powers and their position to benefit the corporation and to enhance value. 
Rather, they may use those powers and authority to maximise their own welfare 
instead of that of the shareholders.11 
                                                                                                                                               
dissenting opinion in Liggett Co. v. Lee (1933) 288 U.S. 517, 541, 565: ‘The typical business 
corporation of the last century, owned by a small group of individuals, managed by their owners, 
and limited in size by their personal wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns in which the 
lives of … thousands of employees and the property of … thousands of investors are subjected, 
through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few men.’ On the commonalities with the 
UK, see La Porta, et al., supra n. 7, at pp. 491-498; R. La Porta, ‘Law and Finance’, 106 Journal 
of Political Economy (1998) p. 1113, at p. 1147. Some argue that the separation of ownership and 
control has never materialised due to the operation of competitive product, capital and manage-
rial-labour markets, which provide managers with incentives to act in their shareholders’ best 
interests. See generally D. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’, 35 Vanderbilt Law 
Review (1982) p. 1259, at pp. 1261-1265. 
9 B. Cheffins, ‘The Trajectory of Corporate Law Scholarship’, 63 Cambridge Law Journal 
(2004) p. 456, at p. 482. The author observes that ‘the Berle-Means analysis of the widely held 
company implied that shareholders potentially might be subjected to the untrammelled whims of 
powerful executives’. See also B. Manning, ‘Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform’, 41 
Law and Contemporary Problems (1977) p. 3, at p. 15, remarking that ‘Berle and Means saw the 
mass of shareholders as victims whose franchise had been usurped’. 
10  J.W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 
1780-1970 (University Press of Virginia 1970), at p. 57. 
11  F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1991), at p. 112; S.M. Bainbridge, ‘The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights’, 53 UCLA Law Review (2006) p. 601, at p. 625, commenting that ‘[g]iven human nature, 
it would be surprising indeed if directors did not sometimes shirk or self-deal. Consequently, 
much of corporate law is best understood as a mechanism for constraining agency costs’. For an 
interesting discussion on the forces that drive self-dealing behaviour of market participants, see L. 
Enriques and G. Hertig, ‘Improving the Governance of Financial Supervisors’, European Busi-
ness Organization Law Review (2011) p. 357, at pp. 362-363. Cf. J.A.C. Hetherington, ‘Fact and 
Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility’, 21 Stanford Law 
Review (1969) p. 248, at p. 260, submitting that ‘to a very large extent managerial aspirations are 
compatible with the expectations of shareholders’. 
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All this, in turn, has become ‘the master problem for research’12 in corporate law 
over the decades following its exposition. Certainly, scholarly thought on the 
subject has long been vociferous in identifying the change as a transformation of 
close corporations into public-issue corporations that is assumed to have relaxed 
constraints on corporate and managerial behaviour. Modern corporate legal doctrine 
therefore takes as its ‘leading structural question’13 the task of constraining the 
ability of corporate actors to abuse their discretion to take advantage of each other. 
Out of this inquiry, the remedy prescribed for the impotent shareholder has been the 
conferment of certain control rights to which the management is subject in exercis-
ing its broad discretionary powers. One might argue, certainly in respect of UK 
corporate law,14 that its basic premise manifests deliberate policy choices in favour 
of allowing shareholders to exercise residual and ultimate sovereignty in corpora-
tions. Correspondingly, the fact that US shareholders vote and have the power to 
oust the board of directors and corporate management is considered to be a very 
powerful incentive for directors and managers to focus their attention on sharehold-
ers.15 
As corporate lawyers are well aware, a central and energetic contemporary de-
bate that abounds predominantly in the US, but also in the UK,16 has concerned the 
                                                                                                                                               
12  R. Romano, ‘Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform’, 36 Stanford Law Review (1984) p. 
923, at p. 923. See also A.A. Berle, ‘Modern Functions of the Corporate System’, 62 Columbia 
Law Review (1962) p. 433, at p. 433. As Berle himself observed in 1962, his work with Means 
had achieved the status of ‘folklore’. 
13  W.W. Bratton and M.L. Wachter, ‘The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment’, 158 Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review (2010) p. 653, at p. 655. See also L.C.B. Gower, ‘Some 
Contrasts Between British and American Corporate Law’, 69 Harvard Law Review (1956) p. 
1369, at p. 1373, writing in 1956, Gower refers to this as one of the ‘vital corporate law problems 
of this century’. Cf. Manning, supra n. 9, at p. 15, remarking that ‘not even the most perfervid 
shareholder democrat would claim that these issues of shareholder participation constitute a 
national crisis or even make up a significant fraction of the public policy issues that relate to 
large-scale business enterprises’. It is respectfully submitted that this latter view is now outdated. 
14  M. Moore, ‘Shareholder Empowerment and the Allocation of Corporate Sovereignty: UK v 
US Approaches’, Vanderbilt-Queen Mary Corporate Law Conference ‘Perspectives on Anglo-
American Corporate Governance’, London, 22 March 2012; Nolan, supra n. 4, at p. 94. 
15  L.M. Fairfax, ‘The Future of Shareholder Democracy’, 84 Indiana Law Journal (2009) p. 
1259, at p. 1262; L.E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (Yale 
University Press 2001), at p. 101; Hetherington, supra n. 11, at p. 250. In the US, it is Section 
141(a) Delaware General Corporation Law, not the shareholders, which empowers the board to 
manage the corporation. For a brief but useful discussion on the question of whether the constitu-
tion can change this provision and give some power back to the shareholders, see D. Kershaw, 
Company Law in Context: Texts and Materials, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press 2012), at p. 
213 et seq. 
16  This is primarily in respect of Anglo-American corporate law, which is generally assumed 
to follow a shareholder capitalism model. See, e.g., J.N. Gordon and M.J. Roe, eds., Convergence 
and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press 2004). On the differences 
between the two jurisdictions, see Gower, supra n. 13, at p. 1369, stating that the paradigm 
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law which governs these decision-making powers of the shareholders.17 It is gener-
ally accepted that shareholders, on the face of it, retain important ‘quasi-
participatory rights’ in corporate affairs, but the extent and propriety of which is 
obviously open to question. This has prompted some theorists to remark that 
‘[c]orporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy’.18 The 
debate does, indeed, include many views on practically every issue, but participants 
fall into two schools: those who propose reform – of corporate law, of governance 
structure, or otherwise – and those who do not. These positions are as far apart as 
ever. The author is under no illusions that it would be possible to bridge the gulf 
between the important intellectual and political views at stake. But it is useful to 
provide a concise summary of the major themes in the literature on this subject, 
with references to the principal contributions to it. While expression of the legal 
issues in such terms involves a degree of oversimplification, the following charac-
terisation nonetheless frames much of the shareholder empowerment literature. 
One line of reasoning has forcefully argued normatively for increasing share-
holder power (i.e., voting rights) and hence potentially shifting authority from 
corporate officers and directors to the corporation’s shareholders, as a profound and 
largely beneficial mechanism of accountability, and thereby improving corporate 
performance and value.19 Concerns about directors’ abuse of power have encour-
                                                                                                                                               
differences between US and UK law, which directly affect the balance of power between share-
holders and the board of directors, arguably derive from deep historical differences in the evolu-
tion of corporations in these jurisdictions. 
17  C.M. Bruner, ‘The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law’, 59 Alabama Law Review 
(2008) p. 1385, at p. 1422, remarking that the ambivalence of corporate law lies at the heart of the 
continuing discussion over the problem of the shareholder-management relationship. For two 
alternative perspectives that suggest the arguments here rest specifically on the ambivalence over 
the appropriate role of the equity investor, see J.G. Hill, ‘The Rising Tension between Shareholder 
and Director Power in the Common Law World’, 18 Corporate Governance (2010) p. 344, at p. 
346; D.T. Mitchell, ‘Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy’, 63 
Washington and Lee Law Review (2006) p. 1503, at p. 1506. 
18  G. Hayden and M.T. Bodie, ‘Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board 
Primacy’, 51 William and Mary Law Review (2010) p. 2071, at p. 2071. See also Bratton and 
Wachter, supra n. 13, at p. 656, commenting that the question ‘holds a choice between a share-
holder-driven, agency model of the corporation, guided by informational signals from the finan-
cial markets, and the prevailing legal model, which vests business decision-making in managers 
who possess an informational advantage regarding business conditions’. For an alternative 
perspective on the debate, see Mitchell, ibid., at p. 1509, advocating that ‘corporate scholars have 
embraced two competing conceptions of the shareholders’ role in the corporation: one focuses on 
the role of shareholders as investors, the other emphasizes the role of shareholders as potential 
participants in corporate management’. 
19  As the evidence indicates, the quality of governance arrangements affects corporate per-
formance and shareholder value. See generally, R. La Porta, et al., ‘Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance’, 58 Journal of Financial Economics (2000) p. 3, at pp. 15-16. See also 
Ireland, supra n. 6, at p. 32, claiming that ‘there is widespread agreement that shareholders have 
an important role to play in ensuring good governance’; A. Sykes, ‘Proposals for Internationally 
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aged academics, practitioners and policy-makers to search for mechanisms that 
would increase shareholders’ ability to intervene and impose arrangements address-
ing identified governance problems and flaws. Few US commentators seem to 
doubt that there is ‘ample room for increasing shareholder power’ under US corpo-
rate law.20 As a concomitant to this argument, the European Commission.21 and the 
US.22 have initiated recent attempts at shareholder empowerment. 
Although shareholders may be comparatively weaker in terms of their capacity 
for making a decision.23 as well as their incentives to make an informed decision,24 
corporate law provides that, in some instances, a weak and uninformed decision-
maker may be better than a conflicted one. The most well-known advocate of 
shareholder democracy is Lucian Bebchuk,25 a jurist famed for his outspoken 
fidelity to shareholder sovereignty or shareholder primacy.26 His recent intellectual 
                                                                                                                                               
Competitive Corporate Governance in Britain and America’, 2 Corporate Governance (1994) p. 
187, at p. 194, asserting that ‘effective, internationally competitive corporate governance requires 
the efficient discharge of the ownership role’. 
20  I. Anabtawi, ‘Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power’, 53 UCLA Law Re-
view (2006) p. 561, at p. 569; L.A. Stout, ‘The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control’, 93 
Vanderbilt Law Review (2007) p. 789. 
21  European Commission, supra n. 3. 
22  Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, supra n. 2. 
23  F.H Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, ‘Voting in Corporate Law’, 26 Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics (1983) p. 395, at p. 397, remarking that ‘the passive investors have neither the willingness 
nor the ability to manage’. See also Bratton and Wachter, supra n. 13, at p. 666, who elaborate on 
this problem, saying that ‘dispersed, diversified shareholders labor under information asymme-
tries and lack business expertise’. 
24  On shareholder rational apathy, see Bainbridge, supra n. 1, at p. 1745, suggesting that 
‘shareholders lack incentives to gather information necessary to participate actively in decision-
making’; J.N. Gordon, ‘The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law’, 89 Columbia Law Review 
(1989) p. 1549; Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid., at p. 397, proposing that ‘[n]o shareholder has the 
right incentives to participate in governance’. Cf. B.S. Black, ‘Shareholder Passivity Reexam-
ined’, 89 Michigan Law Review (1990) p. 520. On shareholder concerns, see, e.g., Bratton and 
Wachter, supra n. 13, at p. 656, arguing that ‘the shareholders come to the table with a pure 
financial incentive to maximise value’; A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
Wealth of Nations (Clarendon Press 1776, 1976 edition, R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner), at p. 
741. Adam Smith observed that ‘the greater part of these proprietors seldom pretend to under-
stand anything of the business of the company; … giv[ing] themselves no trouble about it, … 
receiv[ing] contentedly such half yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make 
to them’. 
25  Bebchuk (2005) supra n. 1, at p. 833; L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Myth of the Shareholder Fran-
chise’, 93 Virginia Law Review (2007) p. 675. See also Bebchuk (2006), supra n. 1, at p. 1784. 
Here, the author provides a rejoinder to some objections of sceptics who doubt the possibility or 
desirability of increasing shareholder power to influence corporate decision-making. 
26  For some of the leading works on the principle, see J.R. Macey, ‘An Economic Analysis of 
the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduci-
ary Duties’, 21 Stetson Law Review (1991) p. 23; S.M. Bainbridge, ‘In Defense of the Share-
holder Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green’, 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 
(1993) p. 1423; J. Fisch, ‘Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
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endeavours outline a proposal for instrumental reform of specified areas of US 
corporate law or the corporation’s internal structure which would enable sharehold-
ers to intervene in ongoing governance arrangements, but without undermining the 
important managerial role of the directors.27 The argument rests on the basic prem-
ise that the prevailing governance model fails to provide a platform conducive to 
aggressive entrepreneurship and instead invites management self-dealing and 
conservative decision-making biased towards empire-building or institutional 
stability.28 Other scholars believe that expanding shareholder democracy will lead 
to greater managerial accountability, thereby curbing managers’ abuses of authority 
and ensuring that this powerful interest group focuses more on shareholder con-
cerns.29 Even the Delaware courts have observed that ‘[t]he shareholder franchise is 
the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power 
rests’.30 Above all, increased shareholder rights are viewed as an alternative regula-
tory technique to a more stringent rules-based approach.31 
It may seem difficult, as a rhetorical matter, to argue against shareholder 
empowerment. However, a second set of theorists have provided various polemical 
and compelling accounts that advocate against the propriety and potential 
effectiveness of greater shareholder involvement and in favour of increased board 
power and deference.32 Though there is no one school of thought standing in 
                                                                                                                                               
Primary’, 31 Journal of Corporation Law (2006) p. 637; B. Black and R. Kraakman, ‘A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’, 109 Harvard Law Review (1996) p. 1911; D. Gordon Smith, 
‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’, 23 Journal of Corporation Law (1998) p. 277; Grantham, 
supra n. 6; L.A. Stout, ‘New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy”’, UCLA School of Law, Law-
Econ Research Paper No. 11-04 (18 February 2011), available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1763944>; L.A. Stout, ‘Bad-and-Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’, 75 
Southern California Law Review (2002) p. 1189. 
27  Bebchuk, supra n. 25, at pp. 696-697 (on the subject of changes to the corporate election 
process); and Bebchuk (2006), supra n. 1, at p. 1784; Bebchuk (2005), supra n. 1, at p. 833 
(proposals to amend the corporate constitution). 
28  It might also be said that the opposite of this is true. See L.M. Fairfax, ‘Making the Corpo-
ration Safe for Shareholder Democracy’, 69 Ohio State Law Journal (2008) p. 53, at p. 55, 
remarking that ‘[m]any shareholders believe that accounting and other corporate governance 
scandals were caused, at least in part, by a lack of sufficient director and officer accountability’. 
29  Hayden and Bodie, supra n. 18, at p. 2089; R.J. Gilson, ‘A Structural Approach to Corpo-
rations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Takeover Offers’, 33 Stanford Law Review (1981) 
p. 819, at p. 836, asserting that managers ‘can be expected, if otherwise unconstrained, to maxi-
mise their own welfare rather than the shareholders’. 
30  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); Stoke v. Continental 
Trust Co., 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (N.Y. 1906) (noting that shareholders’ power to vote is vital). 
31  Hill, supra n. 17, at p. 344; L. Enriques, H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The Basic Gov-
ernance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class’, in R. Kraakman, et al., The Anatomy 
of Corporate Law (Oxford University Press 2009), at p. 79 (submitting that hard-edged rules and 
fiduciary standards are poorly suited to protecting the interests of the shareholders as a class). 
32  Bainbridge, supra n. 1, at p. 1735; Bainbridge, supra n. 11, at p. 601; Bratton and Wachter, 
supra n. 13, at p. 653; M.A. Eisenberg, ‘The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in 
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opposition,33 a number of exponents have coalesced around various versions of 
according management independence. These scholars typically advocate that, while 
the board is appointed by the shareholders, the nature of the appointment is one in 
which the power to be exercised is the sole prerogative of management, in order to 
provide it with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term 
decision-making.34 In other words, the large modern business enterprise demands 
that some central body be vested with the power and discretion to make decisions 
on behalf of the entire corporation. Stephen Bainbridge acknowledges that ‘[i]n US 
corporation law, shareholder control rights in fact are so weak that they scarcely 
qualify as part of corporate governance’.35 Still, the critic offers the perspective of 
one who does not wish to see any change in the perceived governance arrange-
ments, cautioning that ‘[s]uch efforts to extend the shareholder franchise are 
fundamentally misguided’.36 Rules according deference to managerial autonomy 
and severely limiting shareholder participation are seen as a deliberate choice, not a 
perversion, of corporate law.37 The current regime of limiting shareholder power is 
preferable because it allows for centralised decision-making, which is the most 
cost-effective and efficient means of governing corporate affairs.38 Similar lines of 
academic thought have suggested that shareholder disempowerment is not a cause 
                                                                                                                                               
Modern Corporate Decision-making’, 57 California Law Review (1969) p. 1, at pp. 16-17. For 
rather scathing criticisms of this and related notions, see J.A. Livingstone, The American Stock-
holder (1958), and the review of this book by B. Manning in 67 Yale Law Journal (1958) p. 1477. 
Collectivist theories, such as team production, go a step further by challenging not only the strong 
participatory rights for shareholders, but also any assumed primacy of their interests over the 
interests of other corporate constituencies. See generally M.M. Blair and L.A. Stout, ‘A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law’, 85 Vanderbilt Law Review (1999) p. 247; Stout, supra n. 
20, at p. 789; M. Lipton and W. Savitt, ‘The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk’, 93 Vanderbilt Law 
Review (2007) p. 733. 
33  Hayden and Bodie, supra n. 18, at pp. 2088-2095, commenting that these scholars ‘dis-
agree on the appropriate purpose and goals of the corporation and of corporate law. However, 
they all stand in support of a version of “board primacy” in which the board can operate in a more 
independent manner than shareholder primacists currently advocate.’ 
34  Strine, supra n. 1, at p. 1763, arguing that corporate law is as concerned, or more con-
cerned, about protecting the core element of the US approach to corporate law: the empowerment 
of centralised management to pursue business strategies through diverse means, subject to a few 
important constraints. 
35  Bainbridge, supra n. 11, at p. 616. 
36  Ibid., at p. 603. 
37  H. Manne, ‘Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics’, 53 Virginia Law Review 
(1967) p. 259, at p. 261, remarking that ‘if the principal economic function of the corporate form 
[is] to amass the funds of investors, qua investors, we should not anticipate their demanding or 
wanting a direct role in the management of the company’. 
38  Bainbridge, supra n. 1, at p. 1746; Bainbridge, supra n. 11, at p. 624. A second concern 
posed by increasing shareholder power is that shareholders may use their enhanced power to 
advance personal or political agendas as opposed to issues that benefit the corporation as a whole. 
See Bainbridge, supra n. 1, at p. 1756. 
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for concern, but rather a positive attribute of corporate law, and that granting 
stronger powers to shareholders would encourage them to engage in predatory and 
self-interested behaviour.39 Under this critique, discourse about protection of the 
corporation from investors has replaced more traditional concerns about protection 
of investors.40 
With regard to the seldom explored nomenclature of this debate on how the corpo-
rate governance arrangements mitigate the manager-shareholder conflict, the various 
unarticulated accounts of shareholder power pivot around the substantive legal rules 
that permit shareholders to initiate and vote on proposals regarding specific corporate 
decisions and other issues as well. Legal and constitutional rights mark out those 
claims and demands which have already, as a matter of political fact, been adopted by 
the legal system and which have available to them some access to legal resources for 
their enforcement. This is not to be confused with the market for control or extrane-
ous pressure, which, to some degree, is predicated on the existence of shareholder 
rights. The latter forms of shareholder initiative pressure, although no doubt weapons 
of some value, do not generally fall within the scope of the debate on shareholder 
empowerment, and they are therefore not dealt with in this article. Furthermore, the 
distinction between active participation in the agenda-setting sense and passive 
participation in a simple ratification mode is an essential aspect of the overall topic of 
shareholder participation in corporate governance. For convenience of exposition, the 
term ‘power’ will ordinarily refer to the specific legal rules designed to enhance 
shareholder participation in corporate affairs, unless stated otherwise. Through this 
lens, the crux of the management-shareholder problem can be opened up to examine 
the allocation of shareholder participatory rights and to explore the possible extent to 
which pervasive, path-dependent assumptions of erstwhile ultimate shareholder 
sovereignty or prerogative are accurate and complete. 
3. THE EROSION THESIS 
The shareholder empowerment debate has raised shareholder rights as a serious 
subject for corporate law reform. There is a large range of variables and combinations 
of the standard response, none of which is especially stable or commands consensus. 
The problem is complex, and this article takes no position on the classical debate. 
Moreover, a general pattern reoccurrence that can be identified as running through 
both sides of the conversation is the embedded assumption that, unlike in early 
corporate law, contemporary corporate codes permit management to perpetuate their 
                                                                                                                                               
39  G. Ingham, Capitalism (Polity 2008), at p. 138, describing approaches to empower share-
holders as an ‘attempt to re-legitimize capitalism’. 
40  R.C. Clark, ‘Opening Comments, Corporate Separateness’, Sixth Annual Law and Busi-
ness Conference at Vanderbilt University, 31 March 2006. 
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own power by annulling the very shareholder rights which, in the law’s view, legiti-
mate that power.41 The overall methodology to law advocated in Bebchuk’s writings 
is a striking example of how the erosion thesis has conditioned the thinking of those 
who would reform internal governance structure and has driven some to seek return 
to a condition that never in fact existed. The starting point for the theory is that the 
‘considerable weakness of shareholders’42 is at least in part due to ‘how far [contem-
porary legal practice] goes to restrict shareholder initiative and intervention’.43 This 
understanding of the sources of shareholder weakness complements Mark Roe’s work 
on how the rules that produce fragmentation of share ownership weaken sharehold-
ers.44 This logic pre-empted Lord Wedderburn, with an article published over 20 years 
ago, to remark that, ‘[i]t is widely held that “shareholder democracy” as a practicable 
concept is now “fallacious” because any idea of “shareholder control as a counter to 
managerial power is baseless”.’45 
At the same time, while the erosion thesis characterises, in a systematic way, the 
scholarly endeavours of academics concerned about the uneven balance of power 
between managers and shareholders, it is more pervasive than this. Those who have 
their doubts typically do not reject the erosion doctrine in its entirety. Instead, they 
tend to accept the paradigm as a pivotal conceptual postulate to develop what they 
consider to be a more fully rounded theory of corporate law. For instance, Bain-
bridge opines that ‘[b]ecause the power to hold to account differs only in degree 
and not in kind from the power to decide, one cannot have more of one without also 
having less of the other’.46 An inference that one could draw from this latter point, 
on which the overall thesis is predicated, is the acceptance of the view that the 
traditional enabling-law philosophy, excessively aggressive efficiency rationales, 
and powerfully focused managerialist strategies have combined to weaken an 
already inarticulate faith in the primacy of owner over manager. It is a natural 
corollary of this assumption that the autonomy of the board should take priority, if 
not complete precedence, over the shareholders. Correspondingly, Leo Strine 
suggests that, due to the economic imperatives and demands of modern commerce, 
a necessary characteristic of the corporate form is to free up management to man-
                                                                                                                                               
41  J. Johnston, ‘The Influence of “The Nature of the Firm” on the Theory of Corporate Law’, 
18 Journal of Corporation Law (1993) p. 213, at p. 221, making the observation that Berle’s and 
Mean’s normative approach mirrors perfectly the dominant scholarly method adopted by law 
professors of their own generation and in contemporary legal scholarship. 
42  Bebchuk (2005), supra n. 1, at p. 842. 
43  Ibid., at p. 848. 
44  M.J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate 
Finance (Princeton University Press 1994); Enriques, Hansmann and Kraakman, in Kraakman, et 
al., supra n. 31, at p. 72, submitting that due to the emergence of delegated decision-making in 
the corporate form, corporate law is sparing in mandating direct decision rights for shareholders. 
45  Lord Wedderburn, ‘Control of Corporate Actions’, 52 Modern Law Review (1989) p. 401, 
at p. 401 [my emphasis added]. 
46  Bainbridge, supra n. 11, at p. 626. 
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age. This means that the historical significance of the need to strengthen or modify 
shareholder rights in corporate governance, described here as ‘a few important 
constraints’47 on management’s ‘great deal of authority’,48 has come to coalesce 
around the view that it is a suboptimal goal of contemporary corporate law. 
Taken together, these views would have it that the corporation has somehow 
strayed from the path of reason and responsibility by disregarding legal norms once 
relevant to corporate governance. This understanding of history has been extremely 
influential. Former Chairman Harold Williams of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission speaks of a need to revitalise shareholders’ democracy weakened by the 
disappearance of ‘historic and traditional’ shareholders.49 Lewis Gilbert declares that 
management has usurped shareholders’ rights by absolute control of the proxy ma-
chinery.50 John Kenneth Galbraith finds it ‘commonplace’ that shareholders have lost 
their powers to managers.51 Ralph Nadir rests far-ranging proposals for corporate 
reform on the ‘collapse’ of state law and ‘evisceration’ of shareholder power.52 J.A.C. 
Hetherington reflects on previous legislative attempts to ‘restore the shareholder to 
power’ after ‘becoming the functionless rentier’.53 Frank Emerson and Franklin 
Latcham sought to restore ‘some measure of control to the stockholder-owners of our 
modern corporations’.54 Bayless Manning tells how the whole body of corporation 
law ‘slowly perforated and rotted away’ and became today’s ‘great empty corporate 
statutes – towering skyscrapers of rusted girders … containing nothing but wind’.55 
John Maynard Keynes saw that managerial capitalism had caused the ‘euthanasia of 
the shareholder’.56 Each describes or suggests a process of erosion; once effective 
shareholder control or legal rules, or both, ‘withered and died, and is no more’.57 
                                                                                                                                               
47  Strine, supra n. 1, at p. 1762 et seq. 
48  Ibid. 
49  H. Williams, ‘Corporate Accountability’ in D.E. Schwartz, ed., Commentaries on Corpo-
rate Structure and Governance (American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee 
on Continuing Professional Education 1979), at p. 517. 
50  The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 1 (1977) (Statement of L. Gilbert), at p. 67. 
51  J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 3rd edn. (Houghton Mifflin 1978), at p. 52. 
52  R. Nadir, M. Green and J. Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (Norton 1976), at pp. 
33 and 46. 
53  Hetherington, supra n. 11, at p. 255. 
54  F.D. Emerson and F.C. Latcham, Shareholder Democracy (Western Reserve University 
Press 1954), at p. 8. 
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Law Journal (1962) p. 223, at p. 245. 
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and World 1936), at p. 376. 
57  Werner, supra n. 4, at p. 1613. See also Bainbridge, supra n. 11, at p. 620, remarking that 
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The problem, in short, is that classical corporate law thinking on the manager-
shareholder conflict inextricably accepts and embeds fundamental assumptions 
leading to a set of overall conclusions on the attenuation of the shareholder’s origi-
nal legal rights and control position back to the earliest corporations. It is the con-
tention of this article that this narrative is a misstatement of the legal position and, 
to an extent, the factual reality. Although the formally declared policy and the 
public’s perception of that policy might have expressed concern for shareholder 
control of UK and US corporations, the notion that the law ever achieved effective 
shareholder regulation of corporate affairs is fallacious.58 While this view is articu-
lated most frequently in respect of corporations which have widely dispersed 
ownership in the US, there is nothing to suggest that the situation has been, in 
practice, any different in the United Kingdom. Richard Nolan observes that ‘[t]he 
first modern companies legislation in the United Kingdom, the Companies Act 
1862, said nothing about the rights of control shareholders were to have in a com-
pany’.59 Nolan goes on to remark that ‘[a]ll the rest of the rules about what rights of 
governance shareholders were to have, and how they were to exercise them, were to 
be found in the company’s articles of association’.60 Elsewhere, however, he ob-
serves that ‘lawyers instructed by a company’s directors usually draft its articles 
(and subsequent amendments to, or replacements of, them) in terms which reflect 
what the directors want, tempered by the directors’ good faith to shareholders and, 
in some cases, by their appreciation of what the shareholders will accept’.61 
The main weakness, it is argued, is that the erosion doctrine is not given any ob-
vious conceptual underpinnings; it is presented ex cathedra and then specific points 
ensue. In this regard, it is possible to cull bits and pieces of history that appear to 
sustain the variants of the erosion doctrine, but it is far easier to establish that early 
corporate law did not facilitate greater active control by shareholders of their 
property than it is to prove the contrary. L.C.B. Gower once remarked that ‘of all 
the branches of law [corporate law] is perhaps the one least readily understood 
except in relation to its historical development’.62 To the extent that this is true, 
such flawed readings of history by pre-eminent scholars and practitioners of corpo-
rate law, many of whom are famed for their fidelity to the facts, are puzzling. We 
can only speculate on the origins of their misconceptions, but all seem to have 
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60  Ibid. 
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viewed their source materials through the lens of an inflexible preconception of 
what those materials should reveal. A simple point is well made by Jason Scott 
Johnston, with an article published in 1993, who wrote that ‘[i]t is a characteristic 
of classical legal scholarship generally, and corporate legal scholarship in particu-
lar, that it considers a question to be worth exploring only insofar as the analysis 
and solution of the problem lead necessarily to a proposal for doctrinal reform’.63 
There would, however, be a serious problem if legal scholars ‘too often embrace[d] 
a research paradigm that fit[ted] a rather narrow conceptualisation of the entirety of 
corporate governance to the exclusion of alternative paradigms’.64 
Though the case is not clear-cut, there is indeed some sense that the legal schol-
arship and practice on shareholder’s legal rights is far more path-dependent than 
commentators have acknowledged. Two conflicting accounts of the diminution of 
shareholder participatory rights have garnered widespread approval. First, it would 
seem that academics who are concerned about the attenuation of shareholder con-
trol typically import the erroneous assumption of the weakening of the share-
holder’s legal position in corporate affairs to advocate increasing these rights to 
improve the shareholder’s position. Second, those who support the independence of 
the board tend to incorporate it as a pivotal analytical construct and use it as a point 
of departure so as to maintain the prevailing orthodoxy. These assertions, it is 
argued, have not necessarily been supported by valid or any foundations. This 
means that much of what passes for legal research on the subject, at least to some 
measure, can be criticised not so much for a lack of originality, but specifically 
because of excessive insularity.65 
For the sake of argument, Robert Solo understands the drivers of scholarly 
thought in a more sophisticated way, saying in 1993 that 
[g]enerally it is the case … that theory nests within ideology. Furthermore, both 
theory and ideology rest upon what Jean Piaget, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Noam 
Chomsky might call a cognitive structure, what Michel Foucault calls an epis-
teme, Kuhn a paradigm, Althusser a problematic, that is, upon a system of con-
ceptualisation and a body of presuppositions that frame the field of controversy, 
shape outlook and the character of inquiry, and determine the meaningfulness of 
the question and the significance of the problem. 
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Following on from this, Solo notes that 
[t]he theory is different from these deeper strata of thought in the degree that the 
latter are embedded in the unconscious. They belong to the realm of the self-
evident, of the unquestionable, parameters not simply sets of thoughts but of the 
process of thought itself.66 
Whatever the underlying reason for embracing the erosion thesis, the fact that a 
dominant theory of corporate action may have certain inaccurate logics that have a 
substantial impact on the path of the perceived distribution of decision-making 
power has been increasingly ignored by the scholarship. Without clarification, the 
law’s existing understanding of shareholder voting rights is inaccurate and the 
dominant scholarly lens through which to view this issue is positioned in the wrong 
place. 
4. DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE POWER 
The core dimensions of corporate law in any given jurisdiction are in important part 
a consequence of that country’s particular pattern of corporate ownership,67 which 
is in turn determined, at least in part, by forces exogenous to corporate law and the 
prevailing variety of capitalism.68 This means that the nature and extent to which 
any given corporate law structure mitigates the manager-shareholder conflict 
reveals various institutional differences in how the law deploys formal accountabil-
ity mechanisms in legitimating corporate managers’ continuing possession and 
exercise of discretionary administrative power.69 More specifically, though it is a 
universal legal characteristic of the investor-owned business corporation to have 
delegated management under a board structure, the standard legal forms for enter-
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prise organisation qualitatively differ among jurisdictions in their allocation of the 
right to participate in control and the dynamics of shareholder power. The focus 
here is on UK and US, rather than continental European jurisdictions, which are 
beyond the scope of our enquiry.70 Suffice to say that even among the corporate 
codes in the UK and the US there are very real differences, but also underlying 
similarities, in the treatment of shareholder intervention. The next section turns its 
attention to a brief examination of the core dimensions of the basic governance 
structure in these two countries. 
4.1 Decision rights in the UK 
In respect of UK corporate law, most texts and commentaries.71 point to the share-
holder body retaining residual and ultimate decision-making authority through 
statute, case law and the shareholder approval requirements in UKLA’s Listing 
Rules in decision areas that appear to raise acute agency problems arising from a 
direct conflict of interests. Certain of these controls, shareholders are purported to 
have various fundamental instruction and veto or approval rights, among which the 
right to vote on a limited number of end-game governance issues in a general 
meeting.72 and the right to sell their shares.73 Corporate law is considered to grant 
the right to vote on the appointment and removal of directors.74 Many scholars 
would also point to the notion that shareholders have the right to initiate legal 
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proceedings for breaches of directors’ duties.75 Still, shareholder rights are far 
narrower than this cursory description suggests. It has been observed that there is a 
‘certain artificiality’76 about the way the machinery of corporate democracy works 
in respect of the modern corporation. First, under the corporations legislation, and 
standard articles of association (as interpreted by the courts in the twentieth cen-
tury), the board of directors is the most important day-to-day organ in the corpora-
tion. The board is given the power to manage the business of the corporation, and 
the general meeting is not permitted to interfere with its exercise. 
While the general meeting does, however, retain ultimate power in that it has 
various perceived approval and proposal rights, the second problem is that a num-
ber of these rights are default rules. They are subject to change by contractual 
arrangement, either in the articles of association or otherwise. Equally, even the 
default rules are subject to legal restriction in various other areas of law. Of larger 
concern, however, is that voting rights suffer from basic recurrent dilemmas of 
collective action among self-interested individuals.77 To make effective use of 
voting rights the shareholder needs to invest in research about the corporation and 
in communication and coordination efforts with other shareholders. However, the 
gains from voting that effectively polices managerial responsibility accrue to all 
shareholders, and shareholders benefit from the efforts of their peers, whether they 
contribute to them or not. Therefore, shareholders tend to be ‘rationally apathetic’. 
They usually do not engage in active monitoring, either because the returns to the 
holdings of any one shareholder from monitoring would not warrant the costs to 
that shareholder (even though shareholders would benefit in the aggregate from 
monitoring by more than its costs) or because shareholders who would gain enough 
individuality to justify efforts hope to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of their peers. 
4.2 Decision rights in the US 
To contextualise the balance of power in UK corporations, it is helpful to look at 
how the US addresses the distribution of power issue. In contrast to the position in 
the UK, under Delaware corporate law (the de facto national corporate law of the 
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US) the default position is set clearly in favour of the board.78 The principal reason 
for this is because the authority of the board to exercise the powers of the corpora-
tion is considered to be provided by statute rather than originally located with the 
shareholder body.79 The distribution of power, theoretically, could be altered to 
provide shareholders in a US corporation with instruction rights, but in practice one 
does not see amendments to the certificate of incorporation.80 Nonetheless, the 
Delaware General Corporation Law does provide for shareholder approval rights, 
by majority resolution, in relation to one type of significant transaction, namely, the 
sale (not the purchase) of assets which amount to ‘all or substantially all’81 of the 
assets of the corporation. Certainly, for listed corporations, UK significant transac-
tions regulation with its 25 per cent value threshold is far more intrusive into board 
managerial authority than US regulation. Similarly, the use of veto rights as a tool 
to regulate agency problems is less common in the US than in the UK. For exam-
ple, shareholders do not have rights of approval in relation to share issues, and 
direct conflicts of interest are typically dealt with through board approval or court 
review rather than shareholder approval. While the power to amend the corpora-
tion’s constitutional documents is originally located with the shareholder body, the 
certificate can,82 and typically does,83 provide that the directors have the power to 
amend or repeal the by-laws. In other areas, for example, ‘end-game’ corporate 
decisions such as mergers, as in the UK, shareholder approval is required.84 
Under the position in US corporate law, the shareholder body reserves the right 
to vote on the appointment and removal of directors.85 There are two default posi-
tions in relation to the rights given to shareholders to remove directors from office. 
If the corporation has a classified board, then the default rule is that directors can 
only be removed ‘for cause’. The certificate of incorporation can be amended to 
provide ‘without cause’ removal, but in practice a considerable number of large US 
corporations have classified boards providing for ‘with cause’ removal. Although 
there has been relatively limited judicial attention to the meaning of the term, one 
can only conclude that this right is reserved only for the most egregiouscases.86 If a 
                                                                                                                                               
78  W.W. Bratton, ‘Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency 
Rights’, 50 Washington and Lee Law Review (1993) p. 1449, at p. 1475, remarking that 
‘[c]orporate law is an institution that holds a commitment to management’. 
79  Section 141(a) Delaware General Corporation Law. The board’s power, accordingly, is said 
to be ‘original and undelegated’. 
80  Kershaw, supra n. 15, at p. 213 et seq. 
81  Section 271 Delaware General Corporation Law. 
82  Section 109 Delaware General Corporation Law. 
83  Kurz v. Holbrook 989 A.2d 140 (2010), remarking that ‘the charters of Delaware corpora-
tions routinely grant this authority to the board’. 
84  Section 251 Delaware General Corporation Law. 
85  Section 141(k) Delaware General Corporation Law. 
86  Ralph Campbell v. Loew’s Incorporated 134 A 2d 565 (Del 1957). The case also provides 
that if a director is to be removed for cause the director must receive adequate notice of the 
166 Daniel Attenborough EBOR 14 (2013) 
corporation does not have a classified board, then the removal right is a ‘with or 
without cause’ removal right identical to the removal right set forth in the UK 
corporations legislation. Of course, in order to remove directors in between annual 
general meetings the shareholders would have to be able to convene an interim 
meeting. But they would only have this right in a US corporation if it is explicitly 
granted to them in the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws, which in many 
corporations is not the case.87 Above all, it should not be forgotten that analogous to 
the UK, shareholder voting in the US has had ‘a very uneven history’.88 Directors 
and management tenure in a US corporation is, therefore, significantly more secure 
than in the UK. 
5. RETHINKING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
The proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference to the pur-
poses they serve would today scarcely be regarded as an exciting truth. The notion 
that law exists as an act the sole purpose of which is to achieve something else has 
been commonplace for over a century. There is, however, no justification for as-
suming, because this attitude has now achieved respectability and even triteness, 
that it enjoys a pervasive application in practice. We are still all too willing to 
embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts without the 
orientation which comes from the simply inquiry: toward what end is this activity 
directed? In no field is this more true than in that of shareholder legal rights. The 
evisceration of shareholder rights envisaged by traditional corporate legal knowl-
edge has profoundly influenced the debate on who does, and who should, control 
the modern corporation. It has helped not only to define the issues, but to stimulate 
the debate itself. In this article, that assumption is questioned; the internal devices 
to protect shareholders from managerial discretion, it is argued, have not eroded but 
remained constant and unchanged. For, in the assessment of these rights, the law 
tends to be conceived, not as a theoretical and political understanding of distribu-
tion, or redistribution, of power, but as being organised around the definite detailed 
legal consequence to a definite detailed state of fact. 
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Corporate law scholars agonising over and debating shareholders’ legal rights 
and constitutional rights have, as of yet, failed to synthesise, to rationalise and to 
expound the ideological character of rights; classical legal exposition is concerned 
mainly with ordering a corpus of knowledge, and questions about the fundamental 
and theoretical core or essence of such rights are typically unchallenged. This 
article contends that without a wider and reflective theorisation of the problem of 
shareholder rights, it will not be possible to move beyond the simple opposition 
between ‘for’ and ‘against’ rights stances. A tough and coherent theorisation should 
assist in advancing a more powerful perspective of rights, a perspective of rights 
without illusions. In order to discuss the valuable contribution, with respect to both 
research and practice, which political philosophy can and should make to the study 
of shareholder legal rights, this theorisation will be done primarily by examining a 
developing literature on the theory of legal rights and constitutional rights, which 
holds great promise for its applicability to shareholder participatory rights. 
The philosophical study of rights has long been a subject of interest to legal 
scholars and practitioners.89 One distinguished American legal scholar, writing in 
1922, remarked that ‘[t]he great juristic achievement of the nineteenth century is 
the thorough working out of a system of individual legal rights’.90 The idea that 
legal rights have some intrinsic value is widespread in the contemporary era.91 A 
familiar proposition of political philosophy is that rights claims can make a state-
ment of entitlement that is universal and categorical. The idea of rights has often 
been seized on as a way of avoiding the casuistry of arcane computations of the 
utilitarian calculus – a way of insisting that certain basic rights are to be secured 
and certain deleterious behaviour prohibited.92 Different theories will identify 
different individual rights – to freedom, independence, dignity, etc. – as having 
fundamental and abiding importance, and they will regard a sense of that impor-
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tance as a general basis for normativity within the theory.93 Most modern theories 
of rights commit themselves to democratic rights: the right to participate in the 
political process through voting, speech, activism, and so on.94 It is easily assumed 
that the typical ascription of rights to vote in the election of a UK-US corporation’s 
board of directors and on other major issues facing the corporation translates di-
rectly into an extension of the actual protection of those rights within political 
philosophy.95 It has been suggested, adroitly, that the theory of rights ‘forms a 
major part of the cultural capital that capitalism’s culture has given us’.96 In this 
regard, the participatory rights of shareholders, in their logical form, are best under-
stood as ‘conceptual markers’,97 used to designate a subset of legitimate interests or 
entitlements that warrant a privileged status in corporate law. 
Despite an extensive and powerful defence of the relevance and value of 
rights,98 a diverse range of positions are hostile towards the illusions generated by 
the liberal ‘myth of rights’.99 For instance, Mark Tushnet has disputed the claim that 
‘the idea of rights is politically useful’ and argued that ‘the idea of rights is affirma-
tively harmful to the party of humanity’.100 The scepticism concerning rights is, of 
course, not new. It can be found in the writings of conservatives like Burke as well 
as progressives and radicals such as Bentham and Marx.101 More recent voices have 
taken the form of both general theoretical critiques of rights.102 and conclusions 
derived from the study of the experience of particular social or political move-
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ments.103 Central to this perspective is an understanding of the dynamic interrela-
tionship of rights and a hegemonic order, as well as the ways in which rights dis-
course can reinforce alienation and passivity. For, an increasing scepticism and 
suspicion of rights theory and rights discourse concerns the capacity of rights to 
produce and entrench illusory, rather than genuine, forms of equality, individuality 
and community. Rights have been criticised for introducing false abstractions.104 that 
deny meaningful participation while entrenching real differences and concrete 
identities, and for promoting egoism and atomism at the expense of community and 
solidarity.105 At the same time, these illusory forms contribute significantly to the 
persistence of a capitalist system which necessarily precludes the realisation of 
genuine equality, individuality and community.106 In other words, rights are double-
edged; if rights codify, even if they may slightly mitigate, certain modalities of 
subordination or exclusion, these rights are constructs that perpetuate the very 
powers they were designed to confront.107 
As a number of scholars have shown so clearly in their respective studies of the 
labour and the civil rights movements,108 the long-term effects of a legal strategy 
based primarily on the acquisition of legal rights tends to weaken the power of 
popular movements because such a strategy allows the institutional order to define 
the terms of the power dynamic. Let us consider the example of the labour rights 
movement. The internally contradictory roles and setting of collective bargaining 
law have precipitated two great challenges to theorists guiding and fostering its 
development from the traditional liberal perspective. The first is to explain how and 
why collective bargaining law simultaneously encourages and represses workers’ 
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self-expression through the medium of industrial conflict. While collective bargain-
ing law, on the one hand, invites and authorises workers to void and advance their 
needs through self-organisation and collective action, at the same time it limits 
worker self-expression through industrial conflict by establishing a co-opting, 
atomising, struggle-dissipating framework that narrowly circumscribes the lawful 
boundaries of collective action. That is, the ultimate impact of collective bargaining 
law in many settings may well be to impede solidarity and mutual aid and to nar-
rowly channel collective action into limited, institutionalised forms. Traditional 
liberal theorists of collective bargaining law have had to explain, secondly, how this 
body of law simultaneously authorises and limits employee participation in work-
place governance. For, although collective bargaining law acknowledges the justice 
of worker participation in the industrial decisions affecting workers’ lives, it also 
controls and restricts that participation.109 
In order to understand the significance of the double-edged nature of rights in 
the corporate law context, it is important to provide a right-based critique of the 
doctrinal rights of shareholders. What might a perspective from critical legal analy-
sis add to this picture of assumed withering shareholder legal rights? Robert 
Gordon explains that critical legal theories challenge the core argument of most 
legal thought: that nothing important can change.110 ‘The dominant message of 
orthodox legal training was then and still is today that a basically unalterable value 
consensus, a basically unchangeable system of economic and political realities, a 
basically frozen system of legal understandings and institutions, fix rigid outer 
boundaries to thinkable social change.’111 The point is a general one and can be 
applied to other types of doctrinal incoherencies as well. Peter Gabel and Paul 
Harris have remarked that ‘[t]oo many of us have tended to accept uncritically the 
model of the legal system that we learned in law school, a model that pictures the 
legal system as a set of institutions designed to protect and vindicate people’s 
rights’.112 The writers go on to chastise the mistaken assumption that 
[i]t is not a sufficient or even an accurate critique of this model to say that 
[hegemonic order] controls the legal system and therefore keeps oppressed peo-
ple from getting their rights, because such a critique continues to assume that the 
legal system is principally concerned with rights-distribution rather than with the 
control of popular consciousness through authoritarian and ideological methods 
(one of which is the belief in ‘rights’ itself.).113 
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However, the intellectual history of the field is complicated by the fact that, from its 
outset, shareholder rights law has endorsed and to some extent has actually engen-
dered the democratic participation of shareholders in corporate governance. Central 
to this perspective is an understanding of the dual and contradictory potential of 
rights claims and rights consciousness to blunt and advance power relations. In-
deed, the idea is that as much as rights are basic tools of democratic shareholder 
power, they are also corporate instruments of legitimising oppression. Kenneth 
Baynes supports this impulse when he suggests that ‘[r]ather than functioning as 
forms of resistance to oppression and the abuse of power, rights are themselves 
complicit in the expansion of disciplinary power’.114 A number of academics have 
said that these rights are conceived as being granted to the individual from an 
external source, from a hegemonic institution, such as a state, or in this case the 
legal system, which either creates them (in the positivist version of the constitu-
tional thought-schema) or recognises them (in the natural law version) through the 
passage of laws. Therefore, insofar as shareholders emerge from their passive 
position to act and interact with other shareholders or the industrial enterprise on 
the basis of their rights, they do so because they have been permitted to do so in 
advance.115 By granting rights or new rights that seem to vindicate the claims of the 
single shareholder, or affiliated group of shareholders asserting them, the corpora-
tion can succeed, over time, in co-opting the movements’ more excessive demands 
while re-legitimising the status quo through the artful manipulation of legal doc-
trine. This excessive preoccupation with the appeal to rights inherently entrenches 
and reiterates that the source of power resides in the economic institutions rather 
than in the shareholders themselves. 
The rapid international expansion of corporations in the second half of the twen-
tieth century led to an intriguing double movement in the forms of business regula-
tion. The dominant trend has been to facilitate that expansion, by liberalisation of 
national controls on investment capital flows, but this has been accompanied by 
measures to strengthen international legal protection of the rights of owners of such 
investments. This latter point is important because, in spite of mandatory statute 
law taking some of the space formerly occupied by the corporation’s constitution, 
the last century has in fact seen a proliferation of shareholder governance rights 
since the first modern corporations legislation. Also significant is that the legal 
conception of the various aspects of the shareholder’s status in the corporation did 
not change appreciably during the previous century. However, this has been coun-
terpointed by the rise and development of global industrial capitalism; so these real 
gains have only deepened the legitimacy of the system as a whole. It might appear 
incongruous to suggest that two purportedly contradictory notions can, at the same 
time, be inextricably linked to one another, such as the liberating and constraining 
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aspects of legal rights. But while the law clearly grants shareholders the rights to 
vote on certain matters and to sell their shares, a basically unchangeable system of 
economic and political realities mediate these rights so as to fit into a framework of 
legal regulation that certifies the legitimacy of power relations of hierarchical 
domination, and one of the primary functions of law is to maintain and reproduce 
those hierarchies. This is Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, i.e., that the most 
effective kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated 
classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is 
satisfactory, or at least represents the most that anyone could expect, because things 
pretty much have to be the way they are.116 
With the nature of shareholders’ legal rights duly accounted for, it is appropriate 
to pause and seek to discern the plausible trajectory of thinking on the subject. The 
first point is that the allocation of power within a corporation is a problem that 
never goes away, whether from policy agendas in academic corporate law or in the 
wider economy and polity. In at least one respect, one might argue that the only 
meaningful authority held by shareholders over different parts of the corporate 
governance process is predicated upon private property rights – the threat to sell 
shares in the corporation they invest in – which obviously acts as a form of market 
for corporate control. But it is important to distinguish this type of right from the 
conceptually different approval and proposal rights that form the focus of this 
article. While much of the existing literature views these latter rights through the 
lens of having been steadily eroded over time, it is submitted that the efficacy of 
such a theory is open to challenge. Clearly, the idea of giving shareholders more 
power over corporate decisions has wide appeal among those who believe share-
holders need adequate means to control managerial-agency problems. On the other 
hand, critics of enhanced shareholder rights argue that this strategy would be a 
pernicious influence that can worsen corporate decisions by inducing management 
to inefficiently accommodate extreme shareholder groups. However, and less 
obviously, such arguments tend to abstract away from the fact that the very nature 
of legal rights articulates an ideology that aims to legitimate and justify unnecessary 
and destructive hierarchy and domination in the corporation – with management 
and the corporate entity at the top. Correspondingly, UK and US corporate law has 
evolved an institutional and legal architecture that reinforces this hierarchy and 
domination. It must therefore be acknowledged that it is unrealistic to expect that 
shareholder empowerment, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that 
investors might readily eschew short-termism or rational apathy, can in fact have 
anything other than a negligible effect on corporate governance. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
A central and controversial debate in contemporary corporate law scholarship 
concerns the manner in which power should be allocated between directors and 
shareholders in large corporations with widely dispersed ownership. In conceptual-
ising the problem and constructing solutions, intellectual thought seems to be 
locked into the theories and ideas that focus our attention on a false reading of 
history. The arguments presented in much of the classical corporate legal scholar-
ship rest on the basic assumption that UK and US corporate law manifests deliber-
ate as well as inadvertent policy choices in favour of eviscerating legal rights for 
shareholders. A contentious inference that can be drawn from Berle’s and Means’ 
separation of ownership from control thesis is that the great legal freedom of share-
holders to organise their own affairs in early corporations has been abrogated by 
mandatory statute law. This collective view would have it that the shareholders who 
once owned the corporation controlled it, but due to changes in facultative struc-
tures in corporate law, this utopia ended. This article argues that the consensus 
narrative is a misstatement of the legal position and, to an extent, the factual reality. 
Instead, these legal rights to protect shareholders from managerial discretion have 
not eroded but remained constant and unchanged – ‘crude, imprecise, and frag-
ile’.117 The vacuous character of legal rights and of rights discourse is itself com-
plicit in allowing the institutional order to define the terms of the power dynamic, 
rather than functioning as a form of resistance to oppression and the abuse of such 
power. This is ‘part and parcel of the genius of capitalism’.118 To suggest that share-
holder rights over the course of corporate law history have been anything other than 
empty constructs is an illusory conclusion to reach. 
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